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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the operational impact of recruiting first 
generation Americans directly into Special Forces. Much as the draft inadvertently did 
during World War II, the Army could take much greater advantage than it has of first 
generation immigrants and naturalized citizens. Special Forces (SF) could, in turn, target 
recruits from within this pool. That is one proposal this thesis makes. A second aim of 
this thesis is to explain why this makes sense in the 21st century. This thesis reviews the 
use of non-citizens from WWII to the present, while also highlighting certain features of 
doctrinal Special Forces (SF) missions. The aim is to draw on the past in order to preview 
the relevant usefulness of non-citizens today.  
The arguments to be presented here are conceptual in nature. They draw on the 
author’s experiences as an SF recruiter and on extensive conversations with other 
recruiters currently serving in the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB). This 
thesis is not designed to criticize current recruitment methods. Instead, it explores ways 
to enhance what Special Forces already does in order to target the kinds of candidates 
whom the author believes will prove crucial to 21st century operations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
John Hersey’s now-classic novel, A Bell for Adano, features a first generation 
Italian-American serving in the U.S. Army during WWII. Major Victor Joppolo does an 
outstanding job as the very successful mayor of post-conflict Adano. He is able to excel, 
in part, because of his ability to speak the local language. Thanks to his upbringing, he 
also understands the local populace.1  
Not surprisingly, this book is on the Special Operations Forces (SOF) Command 
reading list. What is surprising is that SOF continues to overlook one of the great 
takeaways from this book: First generation immigrants represent an invaluable pool of 
talent when it comes to operating in non-English speaking environments! 
Much as the draft inadvertently did during World War II, the Army could take 
much greater advantage than it has of first generation immigrants and naturalized 
citizens. Special Forces (SF) could, in turn, target recruits from within this pool. That is 
one proposal this thesis makes. A second aim of this thesis is to explain why this makes 
sense in the 21st century.  
The arguments to be presented here are conceptual in nature. They draw on the 
author’s experiences as an SF recruiter and on extensive conversations with other 
recruiters currently serving in the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB). This 
thesis is not designed to criticize current recruitment methods. Instead, it explore ways to 
enhance what Special Forces already does in order to target the kinds of candidates whom 
the author believes will prove crucial to 21st century operations. 
This requires SF roles and missions to be briefly described. Second, the nature of 
21st century conflict is highlighted to demonstrate the likelihood that SF will continue to 




1 John Hersey, A Bell for Adano (New York: Random House, 1973). 
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Forces is comprised largely of white southern males. Such individuals do not exactly 
match the demographics of the places where SF is most likely to operate. For this reason 
alone, it seems to be prudent to broaden the pool of potential candidates. 
Chapter II examines SF’s composition over time, pointing to why SF should want 
to engage in more targeted recruitment of naturalized citizens and first generation 
Americans. 
Chapter III reviews the current recruiting process. In considering the possibility of 
recruiting naturalized citizens, the first question is whether there are sufficient numbers 
of potential candidates to make a recruiting effort worthwhile. If it is found that this is the 
case, then it must be determined whether targeted recruitment is value maximizing. The 
next challenge is to ascertain whether candidates meet the standard for recruitment: they 
must be between the ages of 21 and 35, physically and mentally stable, and without moral 
question. Discussion about this will be followed by an assessment of whether or not the 
market is penetrable, whether the candidates are useful to SF, whether or not such recruits 
are trainable, and finally, can recruiting be conducted successfully in this market.  
Chapter IV suggests a number of things that could be done, and would have to be 
taken into account, before SF recruits first generation Americans and recently naturalized 
citizens. Adequate preparation is one major concern.  
Chapter V concludes with a set of recommendations for SF recruiting efforts in 
recruiting first generation Americans and non-citizens. Additionally, areas for future 
consideration aimed at developing innovative policies in regards to this thesis are 
suggested as well as facilitating topics for future research. 
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II. THE REQUIREMENT FOR CHANGE 
Legal Permanent Residence (LPRs) offer an exceptional recruiting pool for 
Special Forces. There are approximately 45,000 non-citizens either serving in or 
affiliated with the United States Army today.2 Of those currently serving, on average, 
more than half become naturalized citizens before the end of their initial enlistment 
period. Post-9/11, recruiting efforts across the Army have met with many difficulties and 
setbacks. Therefore, it is important to identify market segments which will support both 
manpower needs as well as address critical shortages within Special Forces.  
Special Forces Recruiting annually recruits over 2,000 service members for 
attendance at Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS).3  The author believes 
that LPRs and naturalized citizens present an untapped recruiting market which, at the 
same time, addresses several benefits of unique significance to Special Forces. First, such 
individuals by definition represent cultural, racial, and linguistic diversity. Second, they 
possess an eagerness to learn. In fact, U.S. citizens of the millennial generation’s sense of 
entitlement does not exist in LPRs or first-generation Americans, who, in most cases, 
demonstrate an almost naïve enthusiasm for honor, patriotism, and repaying an owed 
debt.  
Since 9/11, significant changes have been made to attract non-citizens to military 
service. For instance, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 allowed for 
expedited citizenship for LPRs after serving only one day of active federal service.4 This 
example of a coordinated inter-agency effort to boost the effectiveness of the U.S. 
military demonstrates the importance of LPRs and naturalized citizens to an all-volunteer 
military service.  
 
2 This large numbers is based on provisions made by Congress outlined in CSR report dated February 
2008, Title XVII of P.L. 108-136, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (November 
24, 2003), entitled “Naturalization and Other Immigration Benefits for Military Personnel and Families.”  
3 See USASFC mission letter and SORB mission accomplishment. 
4 CSR Report, “Expedited Citizenship through Military Service: Current Law, Policy, and Issues,” 
CSR Report for Congress, Congressional Research Services, 2008. 
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The U.S. Military and U.S. Department of Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) work diligently to streamline the citizenship process for those who serve and 
these efforts are not without acknowledgement. However, more is needed; thus, the 
purpose of this study. Although the Army has acknowledged the benefits of LPRs serving 
in the military, Special Forces has yet to act in regard to their recruitment. The 
recommendations set forth in this thesis address two major issues: (a) modifications to 
current recruiting methodology and (b) mentoring and development of the desired target 
market. The author also recommends continued research and validation of performance 
measures for first generation Americans in Special Forces.  
A. RECRUITING METHODOLOGY 
Recruiting may appear to be a numbers game. The author recalls assuming 
command of Alpha Company, Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB) and his 
first encounter with recruiting. While sitting with his First Sergeant in June 2004, he 
introduced the author to the intricacies of the Mission Accomplishment Plan (MAP), 
which has subsequently been replaced by the even flow “phase line report.” The even 
flow phase line report describes the milestones for success and failure by identifying 
chokepoints within the recruitment funnel. The SORB uses conversion data to describe 
the candidate’s matriculation through the recruitment process. Candidates are assigned to 
a numerical data set based on several factors.5 A Level 1 candidate represents an 
interested soldier who has received a Special Forces briefing. A Level 2 candidate 
represents a soldier who has taken the next step and signs a volunteer statement. A Level 
3 candidate represents a soldier who has completed all administrative requirements and is 
awaiting Temporary Duty (TDY) orders for SFAS. In addition, a Level 4 candidate is a 
soldier as he arrives at SFAS.6 
The conversion data for SFAS is complex and equates to the following: Level 1 to 
Level 2 conversion rate equals 50%. This means that for all soldiers receiving a Special 
 
5 The SORB generates this data set based on historical trends and analysis. Although there are no 
formal regulations governing the status of a candidate, the SORB Commander has the authority to modify 
the classification accordingly. 
6 Conversion rates may differ from based on recruiter knowledge of SF, and candidate follow through. 
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Forces briefing, the recruiter should receive volunteer statements from at least half. From 
Level 2 to Level 3, the conversion rate should equal at least 75%. This indicates, first, 
that the soldier has demonstrated interest and desire to become a Green Beret by signing 
a volunteer statement. Secondly, the soldier has received all the required information to 
make an informed decision. Thus, the SORB’s working assumption is that the likelihood 
of soldiers completing the required administrative paperwork is much higher for Level 2 
than for Level 1 candidates. The conversion rate from Level 3 to Level 4 is equal to 90%. 
This high conversion is due to the orders process. The military, in general, is predicated 
on commands and orders, and once physical orders are received by a candidate, the 
candidate is unlikely to withdraw voluntarily at that point. At this stage of processing, the 
SORB recognizes that 10% of candidates may still drop out, due to a long waiting period, 
deployment, or family concerns.7 This total process is measured on the phase line report, 
which is broken down by SFAS courses for the Fiscal Year (FY). The numbers 
associated with SF recruiting are driven by mission requirements. For instance, the 
SORB’s recruiting mission for 2008 is 2,000 qualified soldiers to attend SFAS.8  
However, within the Special Forces community, numbers are not the sole driver. 
Rather, quality is sought over quantity. Consequently, the recruitable population is 
reduced significantly. This is the challenge for Special Forces recruiting. As the United 
States continues to expand is global role, there are over 96 countries currently hosting 
U.S. troops in one capacity or another.9 As Special Forces continues to operate abroad in 
regions such as Asia, the Middle East, South America, and Africa, increasing the size of 
the recruiting market will become a more pressing need. 
The argument at the heart of this thesis is that in its quest to find recruitable 
markets, Special Forces has overlooked a natural national asset: the immigrant 
population. Given the fact that the United States is a country comprised of immigrants, 
and beginning in the year 2050, the white American population growth is projected to 
 
7 This information was supplied by the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB) and are 
estimates based on historical data analysis from 2000-2008.  
8 See USASFC 2008 SORB Mission Letter. 
9 Tim Kane, Ph.D., “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950–2007,” Heritage Foundation Center for 
Data Analysis Report, No. CDA04-11, http://www.heritage.org/ (accessed October 23, 2008). 
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decrease and spanning a period of 30 years from that point, are projected to be the 
minority population. This statistical projection is just one indicator for more attention 
being paid to the immigrant population as the next recruitable market for Special Forces.  
B. CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS 
Changes in the demographic make-up of the United States have already begun 
and are projected to accelerate in the coming decades. As the Baby Boomer era ends and 
the millennial generation is examined, a younger, more educated, and ethnically diverse 
population is seen. Various demographers indicate that the majority of this growth will 
come from minority populations and, if predictions are true, Latinos and African 
Americans will eventually become the majority in the United States.10 Estimates indicate 
that by 2020 half of the American population will belong to current minority groups, and 
beyond 2050 the country will be a “majority minority.”11 According to these estimates, 
the Hispanic population would be the largest growing group. By 2000, the Hispanic 
population may increase to 31 million and is projected to double its 1990 representation 
by 2015. In fact, the Hispanic population, which contributed 32 percent of the nation's 
population growth from 1990 to 2000, is expected to contribute 39 percent from 2000 to 
2025, 45 percent from 2025 to 2050, and 60 percent beyond 2050.12 
Based on these projections, the nation's population is projected to increase to 392 
million by 2050, more than a 50 percent increase from its 1990 population size. This 
assumes that net immigration would continue to reflect recent trends. Using the most 






10 U.S. Census Bureau, “Demographics in the U.S.,” 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/foreign/STP-159-2000tl.html (accessed October 23, 
2008). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  
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million by 2030, then gradually decline. Conversely, the highest estimates project the 
population increasing quite steadily over the next several decades, more than doubling its 
1990 size by the middle of the next century.13 
Non-Latino Anglos are projected to represent about 50% of the population by 
2040; Latinos will represent approximately 25% of the population; Blacks almost 15% of 
the population; and Asians a little over 8% of the population. These changes in 
population demographics are a direct result of immigration to the United States. Of the 
nearly 300 million people currently living in the United States, an estimated 35 million 
(both documented and undocumented) are foreign-born.14 Immigrants now account for 
12% of the total U.S. population, and the proportion is growing.15 In less than a decade, 
the percentage of immigrants is projected to account for more than 14% of the 
population, above the peak of 1910, when nearly 14% of the population was foreign-
born. In 2005, the top ten sending countries for immigrants were Mexico, China, the 
Philippines, India, El Salvador, Vietnam, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Canada and Korea. 
Significantly, belonging to some of these nationalities means members can easily 
disguise themselves and ‘pass’ for something other than what they may be: something 
that may prove especially beneficial to SF.16  
In the year 2020, the immigrant population will not only play a key role in the 
economy, but should also provide a much more diverse workforce for the armed forces. 
U.S. population growth without immigration from 2000-2050 would add only about 35 
million people to the recruitable population, compared to 107.9 million with 
immigration.17 Without immigration, the strength of the armed forces would clearly 
 
13 U.S. Census Bureau, August 27, 2008, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/foreign/STP-159-2000tl.html (accessed October 28, 
2008). 
14 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, USCIS Annual Flow Report: Natrualizations in 
the United States. Annual, Office of the Immigration Statistics Management Directoriate, 2004. 
15 Ibid. 
16 U.S. Census Bureau, August 27, 2008, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/foreign/stp-159-2000tl/html (accessed October 28, 
2008). 
17 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, USCIS Annual Flow Report: Natrualizations in 
the United States. Annual, Office of the Immigration Statistics Management Directoriate, 2007. 
suffer. Also, given the major demographic changes to be seen in the United States over 
the next 50 years, the recruitable population will have to include more people of color.18 
 
 
Figure 1.   Projected population demographics by Race: 1990, 2000, 2025, and 205019 
Although the issue of immigration is itself highly contested, the facts are that the 
current U.S. immigrant population is the largest in history and is expected to rise sharply 
over the next 10 years. Notably as well, the majority of immigrants in the United States 
today are between the ages of 18 and 39.20 Between 2004 and 2007, an estimated 35 
million people became Legal Permanent Residence (LPRs). In 2005 alone, over 1 million 
immigrants became LPRs. Coupled with those already residing in the country legally, the 
eligible immigrant population available for recruitment into the armed services jumped to 
almost 2.3 million. Of course, this number reflects total population available. When 
broken down to Special Forces’ target market, males 20-39, the recruitable market is just 
short of 500,000 who meet initial residency requirements and have registered for the 
                                                 
18 See Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S Census Bureau, July 17, 2008,  
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/foreign/addata.html (accessed October 24, 2008). 
19 Ibid., see U.S. Projections for Foreign Born Immigrants to the U.S. Spanning 1990-2050. 
20 Nancy F. Saeger, USCIS Annual Flow Report: Natrualizations in the United States (Annual, Office 
of the Immigration Statistics Management Directoriate, 2007). 
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selective services, and thus, are eligible for active military service.21 The Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) estimates that about 45,000 non-citizens currently serve 
in the active military, and an additional 16,000 in the Reserves and National Guard.22 
Historically, Special Forces Recruiting has not been successful at recruiting 
immigrant Americans or minority candidates.23 Based on demographic reports generated 
by the SORB between 2004 and 2007, minority recruitment and selection remained 
between .02% and .3%. The exact number of immigrant Americans is unclear since 
classification of a candidate is limited to the following categories: White, Black, Asian, 
Latino and Others. Most immigrant Americans fall within the “Others” category, along 
with those who choose not to identify themselves by race or nationality, which poses 
particular problems for accurate representation. Figure 2 indicates an average 
representation of Level 4 candidates by race.  
 
 
Figure 2.   SORB Minority Recruiting Statistics24 
                                                 
21 Lynn G. O’Neil and Omer S. Senturk, Non-Citizens in the U.S. Military (Master’s Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, March 2004). 
22 Information obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). 
23 This information is compiled from the author’s notes and statistical data provided by the SORB 
dating from 2004 to 2007. 
24 U.S. Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB) Statistical Data Sheet from 2004-2007. 
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To date, there are no known models for how to specifically recruit minorities into 
Special Forces. However, common sense suggests that one way to increase high-quality 
accession is to expand recruiting practices into untapped markets that contain large 
numbers of potentially qualified recruits. One such market for accession into SF is via 
targeted recruitment of naturalized citizens or first-generation Americans.  
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to examine the SORB recruiting practices 
to determine the following. 
 Were previous immigrant Americans successfully absorbed into SF? 
 Do national security threats play a major role in immigrant Americans 
applying for SF?  
 If today’s immigrant/first-generation American offer a positive, recruitable 
pool, how can this market be penetrated? 
 Does the target audience meet the requirements for service in SF? 
 What additional research might be needed to develop successful recruiting 
policies?  
To meet these objectives, the author examined the literature on immigration and 
naturalization as well as current SORB recruiting operations. However, this author 
detected no cross-over research that successfully examines the issue of recruiting first 
generation Americans or naturalized citizens into SF. In addition, the Defense Manpower 
Data Center (DMDC) was relied upon for information referencing immigrant Americans 
in the Armed Forces from 2000 to 2007 and the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) for information on naturalizations in the United States 
from 2000 to 2007. The objective of this literature review is to better understand the 
recruiting environment, determine the penetrability of the marketplace, and assess the 
utility of recruiting from among naturalized citizens and first generation Americans.  
A cursory analysis of this untapped marketplace suggests considerable potential. 
Well over 100,000 immigrants are naturalized as U.S. citizens, one third of whom meet 
the initial requirements for accession into SF.25 Furthermore; first generation Americans 
offer unique attributes beneficial to SF in the realms of cultural and linguistic familiarity 
 
25 USCIS Report. 
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and experience, and some have considerable knowledge about specific locales. Although 
the classification of immigrants and immigrant Americans continues to be difficult, for 
the purpose of this thesis, first generation Americans are defined as: Those born to 
immigrant parents who have completed the naturalization process.26  
C. SPECIAL FORCES DEPLOYS THROUGHOUT THE NON-WEST 
The argument in this next section is that the force of the future must be carefully 
tailored to fight and win wars on tomorrow’s asymmetrical battlefield. Today’s battlefield 
is largely non-western and the author can only imagine that tomorrow’s battlefield will be 
more so. Taking into consideration the current education, doctrine, theory, and 
technology used to mold today’s Special Forces Soldiers, he has surmised that, without 
question, first generation Americans would dramatically increase the overall 
effectiveness of Special Forces by being able to help eliminate most cultural, ethnic, and 
social barriers. 
Special Operations Forces deployed on more than 7,000 training or operational 
missions to 200 countries to date.27 Although Special Forces continues its global 
mission, because of the Global War on Terror, the number of Special Forces troops in the 
Middle East, Asia, and South America far outweigh Special Forces Soldiers deployed in 
Africa, Europe, and Asia. Nonetheless, Special Forces remains regionally oriented, and 
although there is some overlap, their core areas of responsibilities remain as f
 
26 USCIS Report. 




















Figure 3.   Special Forces World Wide Structure28 
1st Special Forces Group (SFG) Airborne is based out of Fort Lewis and its Area 
of Responsibility (AOR) is the Pacific region. Today, for instance, 1st SFG Airborne has 
the mission to advise the Armed Forces of the Philippines in combating terrorism in the 
Philippines. Many of today’s counterterrorist missions take place on the island of Basilan, 
a stronghold of Abu Sayyaf.29 
3rd Special Forces Group is based out of Fort Bragg, and its AOR is Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In support of the African Crisis Response Initiative, SOF personnel have 
conducted pre-deployment site surveys and mobile training team missions in Senegal, 
Uganda, and Malawi to identify, organize, equip, train, and prepare capable African 
forces to conduct peacekeeping or humanitarian operations on the continent of Africa. 
Africa represents the clearest case of non-involvement by U.S. military forces during the 
past five decades. Currently, some Special Forces units also work with Algerian,  
 
                                                 




                                                
Moroccan, and Tunisian units conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID) with Pan-Shlel 
countries as part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). 3rd SFG also deploys to 
Afghanistan.30 
5th Special Forces Group is based out of Fort Campbell and its AOR is the 
Middle East, Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa. 5th Special Forces units 
were the first military units deployed to Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001 attacks 
and a number of Special Forces operational detachments trained and advised the Afghan 
Northern Alliance troops. 5th SFG also trained the first troops of the new Afghan 
National Army. Since the initial invasion, 5th SFG continues operations in Afghanistan 
along with Iraq.31  
7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) is based out of Fort Bragg and its AOR is 
South America, Central America, and the Caribbean. 7th SFG played a critical advisory 
role in El Salvador in the 1980s. 7th SFG (A) also played a very important role in 
preparing the Honduran military to resist and defeat an invasion from Nicaragua by 
training the Honduran military in counter-insurgency tactics. Today, 7th SFG (A) 
provides trained and equipped Soldiers to assist Joint Military Operations in support of 
Columbia’s narcoterrorism efforts and runs the American portion of the Military 
Observer Mission Ecuador Peru peacekeeping effort, monitoring the status of the border 
dispute between Peru and Ecuador. 7th SFG also deploys to Afghanistan.32 
10th Special Forces Group is based out of Fort Carson and its AOR is Europe. 
During the initial invasion of Iraq, 10th SFG led one of the most successful campaigns 
against Iraqi forces. Special Forces continues to support U.S. stabilization efforts in 
Bosnia. 10th SFG (A) has also trained various components of the militaries of several 
Middle Eastern countries, including Lebanon and Jordan. Today, 10th SFG has been 
heavily involved in the War on Terrorism, deploying to Georgia, North Africa, 
Afghanistan, and has been consistently engaged in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.33 
 





                                                
Additionally, Special Forces has two Army National Guard (ANRG) Special 
Forces Groups. These are 19th Special Forces Group, which spans the southwest and 
whose AOR supports South East Asia and the Pacific and 20th Special Forces Group, 
which spans the southeast and whose AOR supports Latin America, Central America, and 
the Caribbean.34 
Given the sensitive and political nature of SF and the importance of secrecy and 
the limited visibility of many of its operations, it only stands to reason that a more 
culturally diversified organization would assist in achieving a greater degree of 
efficiency. Recent changes in the Special Forces training pipeline, a new emphasis on 
language, and cultural understanding and awareness, and the increased emphasis on 
regional expertise point to potential gaps that SF could address by pursuing individuals 
who already possess ethnic, linguistic, and cultural familiarity rather than needing to train 
everyone in/on these skills from scratch. 
D. BRIEF HISTORY OF IMMIGRANT SERVICE 
There are a number of historical precedents concerning immigrants in the 
military. The Department of Defense estimates that more than 65,000 immigrants (non-
U.S. citizens and naturalized citizens) were serving on active duty in the U.S. Armed 
Forces as of February 2008.35 According to USCIS, immigrants composed half of all 
military recruits by the 1840s and 20 percent of the 1.5 million service members in the 
Union Army during the Civil War.36  
This section provides an historical overview of non-citizens’ service in the Army 
from the 1700s to the present. In order to understand the recommendations set forth in 
this thesis, it is first essential to understand the history of policies governing the 
incorporation of immigrants into the Army.   
 
34 Special Operations Recruiting Briefing Dated 2008. 
35 O’Neil and Senturk, Non-Citizens in the U.S. Military. 
36 Ibid. 
 15
                                                
During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress granted citizenship to 
enemy troops who agreed to switch sides and fight with the Continental forces,
 
and some 
colonial militias offered the reward of state citizenship to non-citizens who joined their 
ranks.37 In all, approximately 20-25 percent of the 2.5 million enlistees in the Union and 
Confederate militaries were immigrants.38 Since most immigrants arrived in Northern 
ports, it is not surprising that the Union Army had the preponderance of non-citizen 
enlistees. Indeed, roughly 90 percent of all non-citizens who served in the Civil War were 
enrolled in the Union’s military. Only about 5 percent of the 1 million Confederate forces 
were foreign-born. By comparison, the Confederate states had roughly 13.4 percent of the 
foreign-born population in America. Interestingly, the majority of immigrant enlistees 
were of German and Irish descent. In some cases, entire battalions of immigrants were 
recruited from individual U.S. cities or counties because of their ability to blend in and 
operate far behind enemy lines.39  
The first use of non-citizens in the military emerged in 1789 under Article 1, 
Section 8 of the Constitution; Congress is granted the power “to establish a uniform rule 
of naturalization.” On March 26, 1790, the first naturalization act was passed. This ruling 
focused on free, adult men with a minimum of two years of residency in the United States 
and was eligible for citizenship.40 
Locally, state, and federal courts were all granted naturalization authority. The 
emphasis on naturalization continued and, in 1864, during the height of the Civil War, 
Congress passed legislation to encourage immigration to the United States.41 The federal 
government agreed to pay immigrants’ transportation costs in exchange for future labor. 
The only other times since 1868 that Congress has passed legislation encouraging 
 
37 Cara Wong, “Citizenship for Service: Substitution, Commutation, and “Green Card Troops,” Paper 
presented at the University of California, Berkeley, Institute of Governmental Studies Conference, “A 
Nation of Immigrants: Ethnic Identity and Political Incorporation,” October 23, 2007. 
38 Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy (Greenwood Pub Group, June 1969), 578-80. 
39 Sachs Roma, “They May Not Have Been American-Born, but They Fought America’s Civil War 
with Fervor Nonetheless,” Military History 10, no. 4 (1993). 
40 O’Neil and Senturk, Non-Citizens in the U.S. Military. 
41 Ibid. 
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immigration was during the World Wars I and II.42 On July 28, 1868, the concept of 
national citizenship was solidified with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.43  
During WWII, 142,353 enlistees were naturalized between July 1, 1941 and June 
30, 1947.44 A large number of immigrants who served during the war were able to attain 
citizenship. The multipurpose function of immigrants was a lesson clearly taken to heart 
by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor of Special Forces.  
The OSS was established by a presidential military order issued by Franklin D. 
Roosevelt on June 13, 1942, to collect and analyze strategic information required by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and to conduct special operations not assigned to other agencies.45 
During WWII, the OSS adopted the notion of using foreign born natives to help fight the 
war. One example of how non-citizens were used in the conduct of guerilla warfare can 
be found in Burma in 1942. Indigenous forces were recruited and trained by the OSS to 
operate from bases deep behind Japanese lines. Since American agents in Burma would 
attract attention, Detachment 101 canvassed the British-led Burma Army for Anglo-
Burmese volunteers to act in various behind-the-lines capacities. Detachment 101 
likewise made significant use of local tribes-people with the ability to assist the cause. 
The OSS assisted both in the arming, training, and supply of resistance movements, 
including Mao Zedong's Red Army in China and the Viet Minh in French Indochina, and 
relied on such forces to help it defeat the Axis powers. The OSS deployed in Asia and 
Europe, and subversion remains essential to SF’s core mission under Unconventional 
Warfare today. 
The 1950s saw the passage of the Lodge Act authorizing the enlistment of 2,500 
displaced persons from Eastern Europe into the Army. The intent of this legislation was 
 
42 Ernest Rubin, Charlotte E. Goodfellow, Roman Citizenship: A Study of Its Territorial and 
Numerical Expansion from the Earliest Times to the Death of Augustus (Lancaster, Pennsylvania: 
Lancaster Press, 1935. 
43 See U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment. 
44 Henry B. Hazard, “Administrative Naturalization Abroad of Members of the Armed Forces of the 
United States,” The American Journal of International Law 46, no. 2 (1952): 270. 
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to provide the United States with a pool of skilled individuals who could assist with its 
Cold War efforts.46 The aim was to create teams that could be dropped into Eastern 
Europe to organize, train, and lead resistance members and sabotage Soviet supply lines 
via hasty attacks and other unconventional means. The law was amended in 1951 to 
increase the number authorized to 12,500 enlistees who, after completing five years of 
honorable service, were eligible for permanent residence in the United States. Of the 
1,302 individuals who enlisted under this program, 812 (63 percent) became citizens.47  
Section 1440 of Title 8 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 
expanded citizenship eligibility to include non-citizens who enlisted, reenlisted, or 
extended enlistments while residing in U.S. territories, or while aboard public vessels 
owned or operated by the United States. This act also provided for the naturalization of 
individuals who served during wartime whether or not they were documented 
immigrants.48 Congress enacted legislation in 1953 that limited citizenship eligibility to 
only documented immigrants because of a valid concern with Soviet espionage.49 This 
provision applied to individuals who served in the armed forces from June 25, 1950 
through July 1, 1955. The provision expired in 1955 and, in 1961, Congress enacted 
legislation that authorized the naturalization of undocumented immigrant enlistees who 
had served during the previous five-year period.50  
While the Lodge Act was designed to enable the OSS and later Special Forces to 
take advantage of Europeans’ familiarity with Eastern Europe, nothing like it was 
developed for Southeast Asians. In 1960, Special Forces was given the mission of 
training and equipping the South Vietnamese Army with the intent to conduct operations 
 
45 Gerald Astor, The Jungle War: Mavericks, Marauders, and Madmen in the China-Burma-India 
Theater of WWII (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2004). 
46 See The Lodge Act Congressional Order 1951. 
47 Hazard, “Administrative Naturalization Abroad of Members of the Armed Forces of the United 
States.”  
48 Legal Information Institute, U.S. Code Collection, http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/8/1440.html 
(accessed December 2008). 
49 James B. Jacobs, and Leslie Anne Hayes, Aliens in the U.S. Armed Forces (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), 190. 
50 Darlene C. Goring, In Service to America: Naturalization of Undocumented Alien Veterans (Seton 
Hall Law Review, 2000), 427. 
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in South Vietnam. As a result, 30 Special Forces instructors were sent from Fort Bragg to 
South Vietnam in May 1961 to set up a training program for the Vietnamese Army. 
Although ethnicity became a major factor in who could operate behind enemy lines, there 
is no record of Vietnamese Americans being recruited into Special Forces during this 
period. 
Instead, under the advisement of U.S. Special Forces, several programs were 
initiated in late 1961 to address counterinsurgency needs. Thus, paramilitary forces were 
formed from excluded minority groups in South Vietnam. Special Forces detachments 
were assigned to provide training and advisory assistance in a series of programs, which 
eventually became known as the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program.51 
Over time, the development of paramilitary forces from among minority groups became 
the primary focus of the Special Forces in Vietnam.  
The successes of Special Forces in Vietnam are well documented and although it 
is well recognized that minorities played a major role in the CIDG, there is no account of 
Asians or Asian Americans being recruited into Special Forces itself. This had an effect 
on how intelligence was gathered. Not surprisingly, the language barrier proved to be a 
major obstacle for the U.S. Army in recruiting agents and acquiring information. 
Meanwhile, even after an agreement for cooperation was reached in the spring of 1964, 
the Vietnamese Special Forces units were slow to accept U.S. Special Forces 
participation in their intelligence operations.52 Mistrust was evidently mutual, but also 
the two allies did not always share the same agenda. Here is one instance where it could 
be stated that immigrants and immigrant Americans with the right cultural sensibilities 
might have made a difference. Many scholars of the Vietnam War argue that the entire 
counterinsurgency program in Vietnam was a failure because Special Forces failed to 
identify with the population and “win their hearts and minds.”53 However, even when SF 
Soldiers and teams did live with the local people, there were not enough Americans with  
 
51 Gerald Astor, The Jungle War: Mavericks, Marauders, and Madmen in the China-Burma-India 
Theater of WWII (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2004), 80. 
52 Ibid., 88. 
53 Ibid. 
 19
                                                
the right sensibilities in the theater and no one who could effectively mediate as Asian 
Americans and, more specifically, Vietnamese recruited into the U.S. Army, may have 
been able to do. 
SF also played a critical role during the 12-year civil war in El Salvador when 
advisors were tasked with advising military counterparts in counterinsurgency operations. 
The Salvadoran Civil War occurred in the context of the Cold War, with Cuba and the 
USSR backing the insurgents and, most famously, the Reagan administration supporting 
the Salvadoran army. Unlike the efforts in Vietnam, SF could draw on personnel already 
in the force who came from a Hispanic background, such as Colonel (Ret.) Joe Andrade. 
According to then Major Andrade, who volunteered for duty in El Salvador in 1991, 
advisory success during the war could be attributed to three important factors: 1) low 
visibility of the mission, 2) its small footprint, and 3) cultural awareness and language 
ability on the part of the advisors. COL Andrade can recount several instances when 
language and cultural awareness played a major role in what he termed a successful 
mission. For instance, in a recent talk at the Naval Postgraduate School, he spoke of his 
personal experiences dealing with El Salvadorians and the difficulties inherent in 
“blending in.” Although trained in Spanish and Latin American culture, COL Andrade 
stated that “It takes more than a language rating of a 3/3. [Which is conversational level 
language ability]; it takes a great deal of cultural awareness.”54 This revelation prompted 
the author to ask him what the percentage of Hispanic Americans was among the advisors 
in El Salvador with him. He replied with the figure of “40 percent.” This brings up the 
issue, again, of why SF has not done more to maximize these percentages. 
Today, Special Forces continues to demonstrate its relevance given the small 
footprint of an ODA verses the large footprint of conventionally mobilized troops. Just in 
the past decade, Special Forces has been used to coordinate activities on the ground 
between guerrillas and conventional forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan. It has, likewise,  
been used for its counter-insurgency capabilities in Iraq and the Philippines. There is no 
 
54 Notes and comments taken from a class lecture given at the Naval Postgraduate School, on 
November 21, 2008. 
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telling exactly where SF might be deployed next, but chances are it will continue to need 
to operate closely with non-western forces for the foreseeable future.  
E. BENEFITS OF FIRST GENERATION AMERICANS 
In some cases, such as conventional operations, ethnicity, culture, and appearance 
are not important to mission success. Unlike Special Forces, conventional forces typically 
deploy with numerically superior groups, heavily armored vehicles, and their purpose is 
not to blend in but to exert a presence of force. 
Conversely, the objective of Special Forces Soldiers is to keep a low profile, and 
sometimes, even remain invisible while conducting operations in small numbers with 
little protection other than personal weapons. Given such requirements, the ability to 
“hide in plain sight” is a clear asset. Here is where Americans of immigrant origins 
should be a boon.  
Recent articles point out that the notion of turning soldiers into linguists is more 
arduous than turning linguists into soldiers.55 At the very least, first generation 
Americans who grew up learning another language, even if they do not speak it fluently, 
will be able to pick it up more easily and with the right accent than those with no 
exposure to it at all. However, there are also other elements of non-verbal communication 
that the children of immigrants absorb, often without even realizing it. At most, these 
enable first generation immigrants to “act” the right part. Nevertheless, even when such 
individuals find themselves in an environment with which they are no more familiar than 
other Americans, they may still adapt faster given adaptation skills their parents likely 
passed on, or that they may had to discover from themselves while growing up. Without 
question, one of the most important aspects of the Special Forces Warrior is the ability to 
build rapport behind enemy lines. This trait, although taught at SFAS, relies heavily on 
exactly these sorts of innate abilities.  
Facial features, skin color, and hair types are all inert traits first generation 
 
 
55 Kevin Howe, “DLI Launches Efforts to Recruit Ethnicities,” The Herald, October 6, 2008, 13. 
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Americans from non-Western backgrounds would bring with them to SF. At most, such 
traits and abilities would enable individuals to blend in. At least, they would prevent such 
individuals from standing out.  
A Special Forces operator’s ability to be able to blend into his environment is 
crucial to clandestine operations; it is especially beneficial for SF in hostile locations. 
This trait is critical to missions such as Special Reconnaissance (SR). For example, even 
though SF operators are said to be trained in the regional language and culture, most do 
not “blend in” to the environment and, when clandestine operations are critical, the fact 
that SF Soldiers do not “look nor speak” like natives can erode the measure of 
effectiveness of the team. Indeed, there were several instances reported after the first Gulf 
War when rather than blending into the local environment, Americans SF Soldiers stood 
out on clandestine operations and jeopardized mission success. At the same time, there 
have been lengthy, even heated debates about whether SF Soldiers should be permitted to 
grow beards in places like Afghanistan. The argument has been that beards earn local 
respect and help disguise westerners. However, it is worth noting that non-westerners 
operating in the region are able to blend in without having this debate.  
It seems only prudent to pay particular attention to overall mission requirements 
like these when putting together teams for certain AOR’s and missions. Two solutions or 
approaches are suggested. First, it is necessary to be fully aware of and knowledgeable 
about the regional cultural and language requirements. By analyzing what is needed, SF 
recruiters can tailor their market segmenting across the Army based on future likelihoods 
rather than just current needs. Next, SF recruiters themselves must blend into the 
environment they are targeting. Although this is manpower intensive and requires 
planning, coordination, and a degree of luck, the author believes that there are SF 
Soldiers and recruiters out there who fit this mold and they should be made aware of the 
potential impact their presence would have in the SORB. 
 22
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III. SPECIAL FORCES RECRUITING 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the complexities of recruiting include meeting the 
demands for force structure and matching these to the market. Challenges are 
compounded by what Special Forces calls the SOF truths: 1) humans are more important 
than hardware; 2) quality is better than quantity; 3) SOF cannot be massed produced; and 
4) SOF cannot be created after a crisis occurs. For the SORB recruiters, the science of 
recruiting is predicated on keeping these principles in mind.  
USAREC Manual 3-0 states that recruiting is a combination of art and science. 
Effective results can be achieved when the art is combined with the science to position a 
well-trained force in an opportune market.56 This reference to recruiting as both art and 
science is appropriate in that recruiting is based on both regulated policies (the science) 
and unregulated interpretations (the art). Since the many complexities associated with 
recruiting are not resolvable by science alone, Special Forces recruiters have the difficult 
task of making the “art” work with the “science” in what is known as a complex 
recruiting environment. 
Here is the description of the SORB’s mission:  
Conducts worldwide in-service recruiting operations to provide the 
strength for Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, 
Special Operations Aviation, Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Airborne 
forces; Synchronizes and de-conflicts in-service ARSOF recruiting efforts; 
and serves as an information conduit between the ARSOF community and 
USAREC for non-prior service recruiting of SOF Soldiers.57 
To do this, the SORB consists of four companies and a headquarters section. The 
SORB has recruiting stations located in high propensity markets across the U.S. 
(CONUS). Recruiting stations are located at Fort Bragg, NC; Fort Benning, GA; Fort 
Hood, TX; Fort Lewis, WA; and outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) in 
 
56 USAREC Manual 3-0 Recruiting Operations (Fort Knox: United States Army Recruiting Command, 
2006), 6-1-6-5. 
57 Special Operations Recruiting Briefing Dated 2008.  
Europe and Kuwait. Prior to 2005, the SORB, then named the Special Operations 
Recruiting Company (SORC), was headed by a CMF18 Major (O-4). Since its 
provisional activation in 2005, the SORB increased in size and mission. The headquarters 
section is headed by an accomplished CMF18 series (SF-qualified) Lieutenant Colonel 
(O-5). In neither case has the commander been required to have prior recruiting 
experience. In contrast, the senior NCO is an experienced Command Sergeant Major (E-
9) who is a 79R series trained recruiter. He, therefore, brings the expertise of recruiting 
into the SF environment. Both are co-located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, along with 
the battalion staff.58  
The SORB personnel strength is comprised of 74 personnel, six officers and 68 
NCOs who conduct in-service, worldwide recruiting. The SORB has a unique 
organizational structure depicted in Figure 4. Whereas its guidance and direction come 
from two different commands, USAREC and USASOC, with direct relationships with 
USASFC, USAJFKSWCS and subordinate brigades for guidance and support, the SORB 
has the responsibility for filling the directed manning requirements for the United States 










































Figure 4.   SORB Organizational Structure59 
                                                 
58  See SORB Organization and Structure 
59  U.S. Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB) Organization Brief, 2008. 
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Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie Companies of the SORB are responsible for Special 
Forces Recruiting, whereas Delta Company is responsible for Special Forces (SF), Civil 
Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), and Special Operations Aviation 
Regiment (SOAR), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and Airborne forces. Below is 
a brief description of the disposition, composition, and strength of each Special Forces 
Recruiting Company SORC as of 2008.60  
Alpha Company is responsible for recruiting markets within the southeastern 
United States and Europe. Current station locations are at Fort Benning, Fort Stewart, and 
Germany. Currently, the company has nine recruiters, two CMF18 (Special Forces) and 
seven 79R (Army Trained Recruiters).  
Bravo Company is responsible for recruiting markets within the central United 
States, with station locations at Fort Campbell, Fort Riley, and Fort Hood. The company 
has ten recruiters, three CMF18 and seven 79R.  
Charlie Company is responsible for recruiting markets covering the western 
United States, including Hawaii, with station locations at Fort Bliss, Fort Carson, Fort 
Lewis, and Hawaii. The company has ten recruiters, three CMF18 and seven 79R.  
Each Company Leadership Team (CLT) is comprised of the Commander (SF) and 
First Sergeant (79R), and although these individuals are not included as recruiters, they 
do act as force multipliers. All SF recruiting companies share similar missions in that 
they conduct continuous in-service recruiting operations to provide qualified officers and 
enlisted soldiers for Special Forces and for other SORB assigned missions as required.  
Figure 5 illustrates the current SORB company locations.61 
 
60 This information is in accordance with SORB alignment briefing 2008. 
61 The SORBs SF Company locations are based on U.S. military markets with the highest propensity 


























Figure 5.   SORB Company Locations62 
A. SF RECRUITING PROCESS 
The objectives of Special Forces recruiters are to supply USASFC with the best-
qualified candidates for Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS). The SORB has 
established policies for the classing of candidates for SFAS in accordance with AR 614-
200, Chapter 5 and the SORB Commander’s directive, which ensures that each candidate 
meets the minimum qualifications outlined below to attend SFAS prior to scheduling and 
notification of the soldier’s unit leadership.63 
 Male soldiers in rank of E-4 through E-6 (PFCs will only be classed if 
they are to be promoted prior to or during the SFAS class they will be 
attending and must provide Memorandum or DA 4187). Must have no 
more than 14 years time in service (TIS). (Waiverable) 
 SFCs may be recruited if they have 12 years or less time in service (TIS), 
and nine months or less time in grade (TIG) at the time of SFAS 
                                                 
62 U.S. Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB) Organization Brief, 2008. 
63 As part of this policy, the recruiter will notify the soldiers unit of pending SFAS attendance (class 
and dates) via letter upon receipt of application. If a candidate is rescheduled, the unit is to be sent a new 
letter informing his chain of command of the new class date. This is to reduce the amount of friction 
between units and Special Forces recruiting. This task is carried out at the company level and the company 
leadership is responsible for ensuring compliance with the above classing policy within its station and for 
forwarding completed quality checked packets to SORB Operations via SFAR. This information is 
courtesy of SORB Classing Policy dated 2007. 
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attendance. They must be either Airborne or Ranger qualified and eligible 
to Permanent Change of Station (PCS) within six months after completion 
of SFAS to the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). (Waiverable) 
 GT score of 100 or higher  
 Soldier is not flagged, barred to re-enlistment, or pending UCMJ action. 
Soldiers that have UCMJ in their official records (OMPF) must submit a 
request for waiver to attend SFAS. 
 U.S. citizen who is eligible for a Secret clearance (if ERB or EDAS states 
INELG for clearance, provide memo from Unit S2 stating otherwise). If 
citizenship is in question, documentation must be provided proving 
citizenship. 
 Applicant must pass an Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) demonstrating 
ability to obtain a minimum score of 229 in the 17-20 age group at SFAS. 
Preferred method of verifying is for a recruiter or “trusted representative” 
to give an APFT at the time of application. Additionally, each applicant’s 
ability to pass the APFT will be again verified within 45 days of actual 
attendance at SFAS. Soldiers that fail the APFT at SFAS will not be 
allowed to return to SFAS for a period of one year. 
 Soldier must have a valid SF physical dated within two years of the start 
date of the class for which he is applying. Physical must be complete, 
legible, and meet the requirements as outlined in AR 40-501, Chapter 5 
and SORB physical checklist. 
 Soldiers that have attended SFAS twice and are requesting to return for a 
third attempt will be classed only upon approval of the SORB CDR. In 
addition, soldiers that drop during days 1-3 of SFAS will be considered 
never to return (NTR) and allowed to return only upon SORB CDR’s 
approval (exceptions for Red Cross, medical drop, etc. at the CDR’s 
discretion).  
 Soldiers that are scheduled to deploy for OIF or OEF within 60 days will 
not be scheduled to attend SFAS unless the soldier’s unit CDR approves. 
 Soldiers already on assignment instructions at the time of application will 
be advised that they can attend SFAS if they have time to complete the 
course prior to their Permanent Change of Station (PCS), but they will 
have to comply with the assignment instructions upon return. At no time 
will a recruiter tell an applicant that the recruiter can get him out of the 
assignment or that he will be deleted from his assignment if he gets 
selected. 
 Soldiers PCSing to a new Permanent Duty Station (PDS) prior to the start 
of their SFAS class will only be classed if the soldier is PCSing within 
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that recruiting station’s own area of responsibility. If he is PCSing to 
another station’s AOR, he will be referred to that station for processing.64  
B. THE ART OF RECRUITING  
The art of SF recruiting consists of a recruiter’s ability to do four tasks extremely 
well.  
1. Generate Leads and Prospecting 
Generate Leads and Prospecting: As part of market penetration, upon receipt of 
the names of qualified candidates from the LEADS database, Special Forces recruiters 
send out mass emails to the hundreds of identified candidates.65 Station Commanders 
promote the utilization of all possible leads. Sources of leads include but are not limited 
to: face-to-face prospecting, telephone prospecting, unit and center of influence (COI) 
referrals, walk-ins and call-ins, and internet and electronic means. Potential candidates 
are then informed of their opportunity by form letters, which cite SF requirements, 
briefing locations, and times, etc. In preparation for the upcoming mission assignments, 
recruiters generate the letters in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year and distribute them to 
the potential candidates.  
Face-to-face interaction after their most recent deployment accounts for at least 
ten percent of Level 2 candidates. Since September 11, 2001, interacting with Special 
Forces Soldiers in the field generates solid leads. Soldiers who have been exposed to 
Special Forces in action, have worked with ODA members, watched them perform their 
jobs, and asked them questions have accounted for a renewed interest in the “Green 
Beret.”  
Secondly, advertising plays a major role in Special Forces recruitment. This 
process begins with notification of the installation commanders, Sergeants Majors, and 
reenlistment NCOs that Special Forces briefings will be held on post. This allows for top 
 
64 This list of requirements and restrictions are the minimal requirements set for by SORB Command 
Leadership. 
65 The LEADS system is furnished by HRC and generates a listing of all active duty males, E-4, with a 
GT score of a 100 or above.  
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down support and notification of all potentially interests soldiers with unit support, as 
candidates are more likely to attend the briefings. Email notification is also used. This 
process begins with a trip to Human Resources Command (HRC). Headquarters Section, 
Special Forces Recruiting Battalion receives a list of qualified leads based on the 
following criteria: rank (E-4) and GT score (100 and above). This list is further broken 
down by SORB markets at the battalion level and is distributed to the companies for 
action at the company level. Emails are sent via “mail merge” to over 1,000 applicants 
within the target market. Although the benefits of e-mail are abundant, such as the 
immediate penetration both in breadth and depth across the market, along with the ability 
to field questions from candidates, this method does have its drawbacks. For instance, out 
of 1,000 emails, the author’s office received several replies to emails stating that the 
member was no longer on active duty or had been wounded and disabled in war. 
Although the emails are directed to individuals, they may be too impersonal in nature, not 
taking into sufficient accounts the background of the recipients. Alternatively, to put this 
another way, although numbers favor this method for getting the word out, more care 
should probably be taken in generating the initial list.  
2. Recruiting Trips (Temporary Duty) within the Market Areas 
Recruiting trips generate considerable benefits by putting a face to Special Forces. 
On average, recruiters spend as much as three weeks a month on the road recruiting for 
Special Forces. This is different from conventional recruiting where most business is on a 
walk-in basis. The author specifically recalls in the course of two months being TDY for 
seven out of eight weeks. During this time, he spent one week in Europe covering the 
Germany Recruiting Station, one week at Fort Stewart, GA. covering re-deploying 
brigades, and one week at Fort Bragg for quarterly training and mission planning briefs.  
Post relationships become critical to recruiting trips because the leg work required 
to “post” an installation is extensive and usually precedes the actual recruiting trip by a 
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week or so.66 In most cases, recruiters will contact the installation’s reenlistment NCOs 
and post Sergeants Major for assistance while in the area.  
3. Conducting a Special Forces Briefing 
This is one of the most important aspects of Special Forces recruiting. Emphasis 
is placed on presenting the features and benefits of Special Forces in a group scenario, 
where the aim also becomes closing the cycle by obtaining a commitment in the form of 
signed volunteer statements from the candidates for further processing. 
The one constant with the Special Forces briefing is that all Company 
Commanders ensure that the SORB approved brief is utilized and not modified, even 
though recruiters may personalize their sales message with additional “evidence” shown 
before or after the official briefing. The spread of the same information across 
installations is considered critical to mission success. 
The SORB provides an extensive checklist as to what recruiters are required to 
cover in their briefing. The objective of this briefing is twofold: first, to provide detailed 
information about Special Forces to those not familiar with Special Forces, and secondly, 
to motivate those who are interested to begin the application process by signing a 
volunteer statement.67 This requires that the recruiter have a great degree of product 
knowledge about Special Forces and the recruitment process.  
Although most recruiters (79R) are not Special Forces qualified, they are 
thoroughly trained on Special Forces missions, ODA organization, and the Special Forces 
training pipe line. To accomplish this task, the SORB has instituted the New Recruiter 
Academy which is designed to give a new recruiter to the SORB a taste of Special 
Forces. During this training, recruiters experience a day in the life of SFAS candidates. 
They tackle the obstacle course, appropriately named “Nasty Nick,” as well as leadership 
tasks similar to those performed by SFAS candidates. Nor are Special Forces qualified 
 
66 The term “posting” is a function of advertising, which refers to the process of placing notification 
flyers in key locations around an installation that includes briefing times and locations. 
67 Volunteer statements are a measure of effectiveness in SF recruiting. It provides feedback as to 
quality of the briefing and assessed recruiter delivery. 
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recruiters exempt from this training, since the training also encompasses instruction on 
the policies and practices of recruiting. The bottom line is that this program is designed to 
let recruiters learn about Special Forces and have Special Forces personnel learn about 
recruiting.  
A typical Special Forces briefing begins with the recruiter introducing himself. 
This task may be as straightforward as announcing “I am SFC Blue and I am here to give 
you a Special Forces Briefing.” Or, the introduction may be as innovative as beginning 
by speaking in a foreign language or exciting the crowd with one of many Special Forces 
authorized videos. Following the introduction, the recruiter presents the approved Special 
Forces briefing, which lasts up to 60 minutes. Briefings may go shorter or longer 
depending on the audience. In most cases, upon completion of the formal briefing, 
candidates remain behind to continue the question and answer period, and those who are 
satisfied that all of their questions have been answered are offered the opportunity to sign 
a volunteer statement. With his signature on a volunteer statement, the candidate moves 
into the candidate follow-up status.   
4. Candidate Management and Follow-up 
The process of candidate follow-up is continuous. Follow-up is an imperative task 
in the in-service prospecting chain. Special Forces recruiters will spend most of their time 
penetrating markets through casual associations, e.g., phone calls, at lunch, while 
candidates are training, etc. On average, the process from signing a volunteer statement to 
attending SFAS may be as short as a few weeks or as long as one year.68 It is in this 
phase when most applicants are dropped from the recruitment process.  
Candidate management extends beyond the normal recruiting duties. Recruiters 
know that they are not just recruiting a soldier into Special Forces, but recruiting their 
families as well. This may be the hardest part of candidate management. Recruiters 
usually plan for family briefs as part of their recruiting trips. Family briefs are designed 
to answer the questions family members may have about life in Special Forces, pay, 
 
68 Some candidates apply for SFAS prior to a deployment, and in most cases, will not attend until after 
deployment, which may be up to 15 months. 
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deployment, family support, and assignments. More often than not, the candidates have 
made up their mind but must convince their spouses that Special Forces is a good move 
for them. In addition, recruiters help to dispel any rumors about Special Forces that 
family members may have.  
Candidate management also includes the preparation of a candidate for SFAS. 
The SORB has developed the Future SOF Soldier Program, which aims to help 
candidates prior to attending SFAS. This program usually includes land navigation, 
physical training, language training, and various other studies. Since its inception, this 
successful program has increased the SFAS completion rate for participants by ten 
percent. Candidate management also includes the management of paperwork. In some 
cases, candidates may be required to produce additional documentation such as 
naturalization and citizenship forms, graduation certificates, birth certificates, and so 
forth. Candidates are assisted in requesting these documents, and updating their packets 
on a regular basis. The author envisions this phase as being crucial to the recruitment of 
first generation Americans.  
At a minimum, the following tasks are conducted during candidate management. 
 Station Commanders verify the candidate meets all eligibility 
requirements to attend SFAS 
 Station Commanders enforce a 30-day out candidate APFT. Candidates 
will not receive orders for SFAS without a 30-day out APFT. Exceptions 
must receive prior approval from the Company First Sergeant. 
 Station Commanders enforce weekly contact with all candidates who are 
classed and waiting for their SFAS class date. Specific focus is placed on 
the questions provided on the candidate checklist. 
 Station Commanders ensure that candidate out-brief checklists are 
initialed by all candidates prior to leaving for SFAS. Out-brief checklists 
will be maintained in the candidate’s residual file. 
5. SFAS Requirements  
Although recruiting can sometimes be numbers driven, the process of preparing a 
candidate for SFAS requires that a recruiter take a personal interest in the candidates 
recruited. In most cases, the quality and success of the recruits reflect the attention and 
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effort invested by the recruiter. As has already been described, a recruiter’s job is not just 
to sell candidates on Special Forces, but prepare them for SFAS by ensuring they meet 
the standards required to be successful at SFAS.  
In-service candidates must meet eight requirements: (1) be a male, (2) be between 
the ages of 21-35, (3) be a U.S. citizen and have a high school diploma, (4) achieve a 
General Technical score of 107 or higher and a combat operation score of 98 on the 
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), (5) be eligible for a Secret 
security clearance, (6) qualify and volunteer for Airborne training, (7) take the Defense 
Language Aptitude Battery or Defense Language Proficiency Test (officers are required 
to score a minimum 85 on the DLAB), and (8) achieve a minimum of 60 points on each 
event and overall minimum score of 229 on the APFT.  
These requirements are simple, and in certain cases, waivers are possible. 
However, overall a candidate must be mentally and physically tough, be able to endure 
difficult training, and be able to face all challenges head-on. Thus, recruiters are never 
just salesmen. They are also coaches. More importantly perhaps, they are the gatekeepers 
of Special Forces. This makes their selection just as crucial, and maybe even more 
critical, than any other aspect of the process, as the next chapter will suggest.  
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IV. RECRUITABLE MARKETS AND RECRUITERS 
Market segmenting is the grouping of individuals by like characteristics to target 
their needs and desires effectively or to more efficiently promote military service through 
various promotional strategies. Currently, the United States Army Recruiting Command 
(USAREC) segments the market by education, aptitude, ethnicity, lifestyle, and 
geography with the two primary means of segmentation being education and aptitude. 
The education segments include Tier III graduates, those with no high school diploma but 
with general educational degrees GEDs), Tier II high school graduates, and Tier I 
graduates who are those with some college (any college credit, self-reported), A 
candidate’s aptitude is measured based on the ASVAB and is broken down into two 
major categories, Alpha and Bravo. Aptitude segments are sectioned based on the GT 
score. For instance, Alphas have a score of 107 and higher, Bravos 106 and below.  
Since the SORB primarily focuses on in-service active duty soldiers, recruiting 
can focus more on aptitude and MOS. The SORB currently separates its market by three 
primary means: propensity, education, and aptitude. Propensity refers to those units 
within the Army that produce candidates with the highest propensity for success in 
Special Forces. Education requirements for SF are enlisted high school graduates in the 
pay grades E-4 through E-7, or 0-2 promotable to 0-3. The aptitude portion of assessment 
measures a candidate’s ability to speak a language, which is measured by the Defense 
Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) and the Defense Language Proficiency Test 
(DLPT).69 These elements combine to provide the mission box categories of the SORB 
mission requirements.  
The SORB segments are not defined by race, but rather by MOS. Statistically, 
Infantry Soldiers and officers do much better in SFAS and SFQC than other non-combat 
arms MOSs.70 With the expansion of the market to include first generation American 
male immigrants, the recruitable population would automatically be expanded. However, 
 
69 Rank, education, and GT score restrictions reflect the basic SF prerequisites outlined in AR 614-200 
and USAREC Pamphlet 601-25.  
70 SORB Classing and Selection Data Reports, September 17, 2008.  
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just assuming that the market contains a large number of persons who meet the accession 
needs is insufficient. Three further questions must be addressed: (1) can the market be 
penetrated? (2) are recruits from the market useful to the Special Forces, and (3) does the 
target market provide an environment conducive to recruiting?  
A. FIRST GENERATION GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHICS  
The demographic models for immigrant Americans illustrate that over one-half 
(56 percent) of all new citizens in 2007 lived in ten metropolitan areas across the United 
States.71 Seventy-six percent of all persons who became naturalized in 2007 resided in 10 
states. California was home to the largest percentage of persons naturalized (28 percent), 
followed by New York (11 percent) and Florida (8 percent). States with the largest 
percentage increases in naturalizations from 2006 to 2007 included Texas, Illinois, and 
California. Metropolitan areas with the largest percentage increases included Dallas-Fort 
Worth-Arlington, TX, Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX, San Diego-Carlsbad-San 
Marcos, CA, and Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI. In these geographic areas, Latin 
Americans accounted for one-third to one-half of all naturalizations in 2007. 
By examining where the SORB recruiters spend much of their time and expend 
most of their efforts and how this aligns with where they may be recruitable communities 
of immigrant Americans, certain clear gaps can be seen. 
The immigration geographical data indicated that in addition to the current in-
service recruitable markets of the SORB, the potential immigrant American markets 
would provide at a minimum, ten additional recruitable markets of densely populated 
communities of first and second generation Americans. 
 
71 Beginning in 2005, the Office of Immigration Statistics redefined metropolitan areas (Primary 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas), to conform to new standards issued by the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) for Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs). Naturalization data for 2005 have been revised 
to reflect this definitional change. See Federal Register, 65, no. 249, (Wednesday, December 27, 2000), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg/metroareas122700.pdf (accessed November 1, 2008). The most 
current CBSA definitions are available from OMB, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/statpolicy.html#fs (accessed November 1, 2008). The leading 
metropolitan areas of residence were New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA (15 













































































Figure 6.   SORB Company and Immigration Demographic Alignment72 
Key issues that the SORB should focus on in addition to demographics are the 
likely impact of social, political, and economical factors. However, while demographic 
factors such as population density, ethnicity, and eligible male populations affect where 
and how the SORB could potentially recruit differently, there are other factors to also 
take into account. For instance, economic factors can have a strong influence on the 
recruiting environment. As new arrivals to the United States, naturalized citizens and the 
children of immigrants are often in need of economic stability. With the current economic 
downturn, the propensity for first generation immigrants and others to join the armed 
forces is high. Statistical data shows that the relationship between economic difficulties 
and military enlistments is inversely related.73 When unemployment rates go up, 
enlistments go up. When unemployment rates go down, enlistments go down. Areas that 
are economically depressed have higher enlistment rates. This theory should apply to SF 
recruiting operations as well. 
                                                 
72 Special Operations Recruiting Battalion Alignment, 2008; USCIS demographics of First Generation 
Americans in 2007. 
73 U.S. Census Bureau, August 27, 2008, 




The social conditions in immigrants’ countries of origin should also affect the 
SORB recruiting. Prospects who arrive from war torn countries may be less likely to feel 
comfortable with military service. Conversely, experience and awareness may promote 
feelings of patriotism and inspire prospects to want to serve in SF, preferably if they think 
this offers an opportunity to improve conditions in their former homelands or their 
parents’ place of origin. This is a characteristic recruiters should want to analyze 
throughout the recruiting process.  
Additionally, views expressed along party lines might also influence prospects’ 
interests in joining SF. To recruit along immigrant and first-generation populations 
successfully means being sensitive to these finds of concerns. It may also require a 
different kind of recruiter or a recruiter with a different set of sensibilities than those 
often assigned to the SORB. 
B. RECRUITERS 
SORB recruiters are paramount to mission success. These individuals collect, 
organize, manage, process and prepare, prospects and candidates for future Special 
Forces training. The success of the SORB is dependent on the recruiter’s ability to be 
effective; therefore, SF recruiters, unlike conventional recruiters’ need to possess 
additional traits and abilities exceeding the established norms. As part of the research for 
this thesis, several recruiters (both 79R and CMF18) were interviewed and asked what 
traits they felt were critical to successful recruitment of naturalized Americans and 
minorities. The recruiters cited the following elements in their assessments. 
 Ethnic and cultural diversity amongst recruiters 
 Ability to speak, understand, read, write various languages 
 Cultural awareness and sensitivity  
 Greater degree of flexibility  
 Personal and professional involvement in the recruiting environment  
One efficient strategy is routinely to obtain lists of recently naturalized citizens 
and their families from USCIS. Once obtained, the lists can be reviewed to identify men 
who meet SF’s enlistment requirements and possess the desired skills. Those from ethnic 
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backgrounds can then be targeted. For certain ethnic markets and nationalities, it might 
make sense to assign recruiters from similar backgrounds as the target market. Speaking 
the same language and understanding the culture of candidates can help facilitate the 
recruitment process. Sometimes, however, it may be difficult to attain a perfect match. In 
that case, it is at least better to have a recruiter who appreciates the importance of culture 
and language, and has experience operating in another culture and/ or language over 
someone who has never deployed or is not very good at developing rapport with people 
who are not like him.  
In order for SORB recruiters to be successful as U.S. demographics change and as 
SF’s needs continue to grow, the SORB needs to look more like the target market in its 
totality. Often what makes successful recruiters successful is going the extra mile by 
spending time in the community. This type of networking pays huge dividends, especially 
by helping foster long-standing ties that can go far towards creating multigenerational 
pools of potential recruits. 
As most business books make clear, face-to-face communications work best for 
recruiting in a difficult market. However, the process of face-to-face prospecting is 
especially critical for the recruitment of first generation Americas. Likewise, successful 
conduct of SF operations relies on the ability of SF teams to establish rapport with, and 
positively influence, those they train. Thus, recruiters should not just want to recruit face-
to-face to make their numbers; nonetheless, this method is likely to add to the quality of 
the candidate pool and to reinforce what SF is supposed to represent. Additionally, the 
ability of a recruiter to make contact with and to gain target candidates’ confidence may 
provide one of the best tools of intelligence gathering for future prospecting.  
The author personally conducted Special Forces briefings at various recruiting 
events where white enlisted personnel and white officers had no problem approaching 
recruiters after the briefing for more information, whereas minority candidates would not 
attend the briefing, or if they did attend, never asked questions. The author found that a 
different approach was required to penetrate this demographic after gauging the audience. 
For instance, the author recalled one occasion when the briefing began with "Cuántos de 
ustedes hablan español?” This rather unconventional introduction immediately put the 
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predominantly Spanish speaking audience at ease and all others on edge, although shortly 
after the introduction, the author went on to admit that his actual target language was 
French. The point was made: language is important and no one was to be excluded.  
During his time in recruiting, he found that most minorities were apprehensive 
about SFAS and its physical demands while most non-minorities were apprehensive 
about the cultural test they might encounter, and the DLAB, DLPT, and language training 
more specifically.74  
Here is where it seems important to remember that the recruiter amounts to a 
resource conversion machine. They take inputs in the form of potential walk-in 
candidates from the general environment and turn them into SF recruits. A recruiter’s 
ability to convert these individuals into contracted outputs is critical to meeting the 
recruiting objective. One key to long term success is the recruiter’s ability to build the 
necessary social capital which will allow opportunities for future recruiting in that same 
environment. 
Just as SF missions typically place a high premium on regional familiarity, 
recruiting operations need to place a high premium on not only knowing the ‘language’ 
of the target market, but having a thorough understanding of many cultures as well. Even 
with extensive preparation, cultural differences and language barriers can remain a major 
obstacle between recruiters and prospects. Thus, one focus of SF recruiting should be to 
look for candidates who may not fit the standard profile at the moment, but demonstrate 
the potential to be able to do so. Ideal prospects in this regard would be those who can 
assimilate ideas rapidly. It may be that the SORB will need to assist such prospects learn 
how to do so, and thereby, improve the candidates’ ability to be prepared for SF training. 
This returns to the notion of follow-through. Follow-through for first generation 
Americans may well need to differ from follow-through for the ‘usual suspects’ recruited 
into SF. Recruiters will likely need to be familiar with processes and systems that 
accelerate or advance language and cultural assimilation skills. That means they must be 
 
74 Statistically, most enlisted and officers candidates reported having to retake the DLPT to meet the 
required standard of and 85, whereas naturalized Americans had no problem meeting language 
requirements. 
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familiar with these themselves, just as they will need superior interpersonal skills. Again, 
this makes the quality of those selected to be recruiters critical. However, as SF’s 
gatekeepers, recruiters are critical. By helping recruit those who have been raised in non-
western, immigrant households, the SORB can help decrease immeasurably the sort of 
language and culture training needed on the back end of SF training.  
C. THE CLASH OF ETHNIC CULTURE 
The perception of whether discrimination exists in Special Forces is most often 
talked about in relation to race. First, it is necessary to preface this section by saying that 
that author does not believe that SF recruiting or SF itself practice institutional racism. 
Having said that though, cultural insensitivity is least likely to be perceived by those least 
subjected to it. 
Special Forces primarily reflect the demographics of the Army, a white-male-
dominated culture with which many minorities have little or no experience. Since many 
recruiters have little or no experience with minority cultures, it is difficult for many 
recruiters to understand and acknowledge the needs and concerns of people different 
from them, let alone appreciate how best to assist them. By not knowing or understanding 
each other,  some misconceptions that could interfere with good judgment are bound to 
arise such as those mentioned earlier with the recruiters’ evaluation of a candidates 
commitment to becoming a Green Beret. 
The questions necessary to ask are the following. Are cultural awareness and 
education during recruiting briefs being promoted in a positive, beneficial way? Is 
everything being done to ensure cultural diversity? If some of the societal differences that 
limit recruiting efforts can be bridged, eventually it is possible to achieve the goal of 
practicing what we preach.75  
The author personally experienced this not in Special Forces, but with his entry 
into military service as an officer. As a male minority, growing up in a black 
 
75 USAJFKSWCS has implemented multiple measures aimed at addressing the issue of culture and 
language skill sets, with amendments to the language training modules, and the use of target nationalities in 
the conduct of “Robin Sage.”  
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neighborhood, with no previous knowledge of military culture, he was forever changed 
by the military. Upon graduating from Southern University, a historically black college, 
and being commissioned into the Infantry, he jumped head first into what was a white-
dominated culture, which proved to be a real culture shock. In retrospect, he finds it 
perfectly understandable that white officers had difficulty empathizing with the situation 
as a young African-American officer unfamiliar with the customs and standards of a 
different ‘society.’ The only other officers he could count on to help him overcome his 
cultural shock were the four other African-American officers in the Infantry Officer Basic 
Course (IOBC). Support and mentoring in this situation was not very forthcoming. 
However, many white officers, perhaps most, have never participated in a situation like 
this, where they were the minorities. So it is not hard to understand why it may be 
difficult for them to put themselves in others’ shoes. Inadvertently, the author believes 
this affects SF recruiting. By failing to recognize that cultural differences are bound to 
affect judgment, then Special Forces recruiting or others are not served very well.  
D. INSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS 
Throughout this thesis, the author has made an argument for recruiting candidates 
about whom there are bound to be security concerns, particularly when talking about a 
sensitive organization such as Special Forces. This section addresses the issue of 
vulnerabilities related to espionage, trust, and loyalty. These are critical issues, especially 
since positions requiring a security clearance generally require a greater background and 
screening process than that conducted for naturalization.  
E. THE NATURALIZATION PROCESS 
The naturalization process poses one of the greatest challenges for recruiting first 
generation Americans. Naturalization is the legal process by which U.S. citizenship is 
conferred upon foreign citizens or nationals after fulfilling the requirements established 
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by Congress in the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA).76 After naturalization, 
foreign-born citizens enjoy nearly all the same benefits, rights, and responsibilities that 
the Constitution grants native-born U.S. citizens, including the right to vote. Naturalized 
citizens can also apply for a U.S. passport to travel overseas and receive U.S. government 
protection and assistance when abroad.  
The naturalization process is relatively easy, but it does take time. According to 
the USCIS’s, A Guide to Naturalization, applicants requesting naturalization must be as 
follows.  
 Be at least eighteen years old 
 Be a lawful permanent resident of the United States 
 Be a resident and physically present in the United States for at least five 
years at the time of application 
 Be of good moral character 
Upon meeting these requirements, it is then possible to apply for naturalization to 
the United States. To meet the requirements for Special Forces, a potential candidate 
must be able to meet the requirements for the Army at a minimum. However, as has been 
seen, there are additional obstacles: education, documentation, language deficiencies, 
background investigations, and operational restrictions.  
Most first and second generation Americans are at a disadvantage because of the 
quality of their education, or the inability to verify their educational level. Verification of 
educational credentials is difficult for first generation Americans because those educated 
abroad must have their educational level evaluated prior to enlistment. This task is 
difficult for those who originate from developing nations without the same educational 
infrastructure found in developed countries. Documentation and accreditation many not 
be comparable; thus, excluding first generation Americans from service in both the Army 
and Special Forces.  
 
76 The INA although it abolished racial restrictions which previously existed still utilizes a quota 
system and the policy of restricting the numbers of immigrants from certain countries. Although, the INA 
established a preference system which selected which ethnic groups were desirable immigrants and placed 
great importance on labor qualifications. This process only limits the available pool for SF.  
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Special Forces is also more particular than the Army about proficiency in English. 
For example, upon expressing interest in Special Forces, a candidate is then scheduled for 
a series of assessments which measure both foreign languages and English through 
standardized tests such as the Tests of Adult Basic Education (TABE), Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), English Comprehension Language Test (ECLT) 
and Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). When first generation Americans do not 
meet the standards set by Special Forces, it would more often than not be due to a 
deficiency in speaking English.77  
This process is not nearly so simple for security clearances. First, non-citizens 
must obtain an initial security screening, called an Entrance National Agency Check 
(ENTNAC) upon entering military service. Army recruiting personnel are responsible for 
preparing the required forms used for the ENTNAC: SF Form 86 (Questionnaire for 
National Security Positions) or Electronic Personnel Security Questionnaire (EPSQ), 
Form S2280 or Form 258 (fingerprinting forms), and DD Form 1966 (Record of Military 
Processing).  
Special Forces requires candidate to resubmit an EPSQ upon commitment to SF 
because a candidate must be eligible for an interim secret clearance to attend SFAS, and 
upon successful completion of SFAS, the candidate must obtain a Secret level security 
clearance prior to beginning the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). To do this 
takes more time requirements for naturalized citizens and other immigrant Americans as 
opposed to U.S. citizens; thus, lengthening candidate processing time.  
However, the biggest practical limitation to immigrants joining Special Forces is 
the ability to obtain a security clearance, which currently requires U.S. citizenship 
through naturalization prior to applying for Special Forces training. Although the Army 
does enlist non-citizens, they may not enlist for any MOS, assignment, or option that 




77The electronic version of this form is called the Enlisted Personnel Security Questionnaire (EPSQ).  
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f E-4 at a minimum. 
                                                
be successful in Special Forces. Recent reports indicate that the majority of naturalized 
citizens enter into soft skilled MOSs. Conversely, every MOS in Special Forces requires 
a security clearance.  
Nevertheless, recently developed programs such as those designated to prepare 
09Ls and 18Xs offer candidates an excellent opportunity to develop the required skill sets 
needed for Special Forces and could prove to be useful avenues for recruiting exactly the 
kinds of candidates SF needs.  
F. 09L PROGRAM 
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (ASD P&R) and 
the Army G-1 have created a program aimed at attracting citizen and non-citizen native 
and heritage speakers of Arabic, Dari, Kurdish, Pashto, and Turkish into the Army 
through the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).78 This program’s goal is to produce 
soldiers who can work in the Translator Aide (09L) MOS overseas. The idea has been to 
provide more translators “on the ground,” who are language proficient and culturally 
aware to assist commanders. Enlistment requirements with regard to age, English 
proficiency, and ASVAB/AFQT were relaxed as part of building the base for this 
program.79 Enlistees commit to an 8-year Military Service Obligation (MSO) in the IRR, 
and upon completion of training, are promoted to the rank o
This program also made concessions for those who were not entirely as proficient 
in English by establishing a three-day base program at Fort Sill for initial processing. 
Individuals then move to the Defense Language Institute English language Center 
(DLIELC) where they undergo intensive English language training for a minimum of six 
 
78 DoD memorandums and policy letters state that the 09L program was directed in February 2003 and 
implemented in July 2003, under DoD guidance included (1) languages of interest, (2) enlistment into the 
IRR, and (3) a shortened basic training course. Noncitizens are enlisted as 09Ls; most citizens (except those 
who do not qualify) are enlisted as 97L (Translators/Interpreters). 
79 Information provided by the USA Recruiting states that recruits for the 09L program may be up to 
40 years old and must score at least Listening 2/Speaking 2 in language proficiency for their native 
language (meaning they are very fluent) and demonstrate some English proficiency (by scoring at least a 40 
on the ECLT). There is no minimum ASVAB score requirement for those going into the English language 
training; those not requiring English language training must have a minimum ASVAB score of 10. They 
must also eventually score a reading rating of 2 by taking the DLPT. 
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weeks up to six months. To complete their training, 09Ls in the English language training 
program must attain at least an 80 on the ECLT an OPI score of L2/S2 (listening and 
speaking), a Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) score of L2/R2 (listening and 
reading) in their target language, and an ASVAB score of at least 10. After completing 
their training, 09Ls go to Fort Jackson for nine weeks of Basic Combat Training and six 
weeks of Advanced Individual Training (AIT), which is specific to 09Ls.  
Most of the program’s recruits are non-citizens. They do not need citizenship/ 
security clearances (the 09L billets do not require clearances), although they undergo 
additional counterintelligence investigation. While the 09Ls are in AIT, those who are 
non-citizens and want to become citizens can get assistance with their applications. 09Ls 
train under “active-duty for training” orders, which mean that they cannot apply for 
citizenship. However, once assigned to active duty, they may submit an expedited 
application, which falls under what USCIS calls special circumstances. 
Since the program is a pilot, many issues still need to be resolved, including 
determining the right proponency and developing a career path for 09Ls. Again, though, 
the principles of the 09L program offer an excellent case study for Special Forces 
recruitment of non-citizens.  
G. 18X PROGRAM  
Another program worth exploring is the 18X program (18X). The 18X program 
provides an option for non prior service (NPS) recruits to enlist with an option to attend 
Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS). Until the reestablishment of the 18X 
program in 2001, the only way to join the Army Special Forces was to apply after 
achieving the grade of E-4 and a GT score of 110, along with meeting other 
requirements.80  
Under the 18X enlistment option, recruits have been guaranteed the opportunity to 
“try out” for Special Forces by way of SFAS. This option does not guarantee that the 
 
80  Guidelines for 18X recruiting were obtained from USAREC recruiting stations and 18X Briefing 
dated 2007.  
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recruit will become a Special Forces soldier. This option only guarantees that the recruit 
will be given the opportunity to see if he “meets the requirement for future training.”  
A recruit who enlists in the 18X Special Forces enlistment program will attend 
Infantry OSUT (One Station Unit Training), which combines Army Basic Training and 
Infantry AIT (Advanced Individual Training), all in one 17-week long course located at 
Fort Benning, GA, and upon completion, the recruits attends Airborne Training. After 
this, the recruits attend a 4-week Special Operations Preparation Course (SOPC), which 
prepares the new recruits in physical training, Special Forces basic skills, and patrolling. 
Upon completion of SOPC, 18Xs are sent to Special Forces Assessment and Selection 
(SFAS) where they are introduced to other recruits from the Active and National Guard 
components. Upon successful completion of SFAS, 18Xs begin the Special Forces 
Qualification Course (SFQC). If a candidate does not meet the requirements, he is 
assigned to a conventional unit based on his training and the needs of the Army. Most 
18Xs dropped from SFQC are afforded the opportunity to reapply for Special Forces 
training once they achieve the rank of E-4, and have gained more military experience.81 
Here, then, is another path for how to ease non-conventional first generation 
immigrants into SF, and points to how preparation for success can be done when the need 
for recruitment is deemed to be urgent.  
 
81 This information is compiled from the author’s notes and 18X statistical data provided by both the 
SORB and USAREC dating from 2004 to 2007. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Currently, SF recruiting is struggling with its frontier missions and those 
missions’ place in doctrine. Most Americans are familiar with the frontiers in space and 
information. SF leadership, past and present, has placed significant emphasis on coming 
to grips with SF mission standards, and quality over quantity. However, frontiers have 
existed that have not received sufficient attention, such as opening untapped markets and 
making greater use of this country’s ethnic diversity.  
Racial diversity in the SORB may provide a breakthrough in this regard. 
Although not a “glamorous” mission, it is nonetheless a vital one if Special Forces is to 
understand the role first generation Americans can play in SF. By 2030, the United States 
Special Forces will have to more closely resemble the broader demographics of the 
United States just to be able to keep its numbers up when, it is safe to say, white 
Americans may be in the minority. However, there is a more pressing need to get to that 
point today just given the places SF deploys.  
For reasons outlined in this thesis, SORB recruiters need to be better trained to 
identify, recruit, and train first generation Americans for SFAS. The challenge to all 
SORB recruiters is fourfold. First, they must possess or develop the cross-cultural skills 
necessary to build the trust that is crucial to productive interpersonal relationships 
between first generation Americans and SF. Second, they must use these same cross-
cultural skills to make themselves as “transparent” as possible in the environments in 
which they recruit; they must themselves begin to “blend in.” This is particularly true for 
SORB’s targeted recruiting efforts of first generation Americans and recent immigrants. 
Third, they must exploit the advanced technology at their disposal to prepare themselves 
to work in more insulated immigrant communities. Lastly, SORB recruiters must 
ultimately ensure candidates do not develop any dependence on them, lest the stage is set 
for failure when candidates depart developmental training.  
These myriad challenges can be overcome and immigrant communities can be 
tapped.  
 50
The author recommends the following concepts and systems be pursued for SF 
recruiting operations: (1) retrofit existing recruiting tools to include immigrant Americans 
as “high” propensity; (2) design a marketing and advertising campaign to target first 
generation Americans); (3) take advantage of standard organizational resources, leads, 
prospecting tools, statistical reports, and targeting systems, (e.g., SIPER 3, PERSCOM 
Database, USCIS Database, DMDC, and other management systems); (4) minimize 
language barriers with “transparent” multilingual recruiters (5) develop a developmental 
training SF Culture Awareness Center for training, rehearsal, and assessment for both 
recruiters and immigrant Americans; (6) pursue sustainment systems such as close 
demographic mentoring of the market.  
The final recommendation is to express the need for targeted recruitment of 
immigrant Americans in the SORB’s strategic guidance. Without reprioritizing the 
efforts, the approaches described in this thesis will not be possible. Without rethinking 
policy development, the resources required will not be provided and this untapped market 
will remain untapped. 
A. CONTINUED AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis should also have raised issues worthy of future examination. For 
instance, the SORB, should systematically collect, analyze, and continue to monitor the 
following data. 
 SF accessions data, specifically, as it relates to immigrant Americans  
 SF retention rates for immigrant Americans—tracked through the 
recruitment process, SFAS, SFQC, onto ODAs, and beyond 
 SF volunteer rates and methods (walk-in, targeted, developed, mentored 
etc.), specifically as it relates to immigrant Americans 
In order to examine issues related to the recruitment of immigrant Americans not 
addressed in this thesis, SF should consider research in the following areas. 
 The impact of introducing naturalized citizens into Special Forces on SF 
‘culture’ 
 The challenges in early identification and mentoring of naturalized 
citizens’ recruitment into SF 
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 The costs associated with ‘assimilation’ programs, like those run for 09Ls 
and 18Xs, and whether sharing or piggy-backing on these can be done 
 The reasons why Special Forces Recruiting does not currently actively 
seek naturalized citizens to volunteer for Special Forces training 
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